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This paper proposes a shift from the concept of disaster to one of devastation when dealing with 
the destructive consequences of climate change. It argues that today, a discourse of climate-change 
disaster has become dominant, in which present disasters are seen as harbingers of a future of 
widespread climate disaster, products of a global nature in upheaval. The paper contends that one 
needs to go beyond the series of dichotomies that the climate-change disaster discourse relies upon: 
future/past, global/local, natural/social. To frame climate disaster as a product of global climate 
change, and conflict the product of those climate disasters, is to occlude the forms of environ-
mental violence and experience of climate change among disaster-affected communities. Through 
an exploration of the drought in Uganda, the paper asserts that disaster should be understood as 
embedded within ongoing, longstanding, multiscalar processes of devastation produced by his-
tories of human engagement with the environment, including that of war. 
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Introduction: climate change and disaster
Early 2017 saw drought hit northern Uganda, followed by extremely heavy rains 
towards the middle of the year (Anyadike, 2017; United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2017). Drought affected much of Eastern 
Africa in 2016 and 2017, and the disruptions to rainfall patterns are thought to be 
attributable, at least in part, to the effects of global warming. In the words of one 
climate scientist, ‘I most definitively think both the increasing temperatures and the 
decreasing rainfall in the spring are highly related to climate change’ (Funk, 2017; 
see also Oxfam, 2017). Admittedly, defining a causal link between particular weather 
events and anthropogenic global climate change remains difficult, as the controversy 
over ‘attribution studies’ demonstrates (IPCC, 2013). Nevertheless, the close iden-
tification of natural disasters with anthropogenic global climate change has rapidly 
solidified. Only a decade ago, an Oxfam report on northern Uganda cautioned 
that ‘scientists are not currently able to attribute these and other climatic alterations 
to man-made climate change; African climates have always shown considerable 
variability and the influences on climates in Africa are multiple, highly complex and 
relatively poorly understood’ (Oxfam, 2008, p. 5). Today, however, Oxfam (2018) 
explains: ‘Simply put, changes in the global climate exacerbate climate hazards and 
amplify the risk of extreme weather disasters. Increase of air and water tempera-
tures leads to rising sea levels . . . more intense and prolonged droughts, heavier 
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precipitation and flooding. The evidence is overwhelming’. Concerning drought in 
East Africa specifically, Oxfam (2018) adds: ‘On the back of 18 months [of ] drought 
caused by El Niño and higher temperatures linked to climate change, the Horn of 
Africa region is now going through a further drought, caused by a mixture of influ-
ences from La Niña and the Indian Ocean weather pattern. Millions of people are 
facing acute food and water shortages’.
 Even if the definitive attribution of any particular climatic disruption—and the 
resulting disaster—to global climate change still remains technically problematic at 
the moment, the association between natural disasters and climate change has been 
largely cemented, at least in much of public discourse. Indeed, it is rare to find an 
account of a drought, flood, or hurricane in the media that does not raise the possi-
bility that it is a consequence of global climate change: as of this writing, the website 
of The New York Times (2017) features a story with the headline ‘the relationship 
between hurricanes and climate change’, with reference to Hurricane Harvey in 
August 2017. Whatever the difficulties of determining the etiology of specific weather 
events, each climate-related disaster is seen to bear with it the ominous message that 
such disasters are going to increase dramatically in the future. Phenomena such as 
the East African drought are mobilised as evidence of the reality of global warming 
and of the need to mitigate climate change and to promote adaptation and resil-
ience in preparation for inevitable future disasters (Hulme, 2009). Contemporary 
disasters, in this climate-change disaster discourse, are therefore largely about the 
future; they are portents of what is to come, manifestations of the new global reality 
of a planetary nature out of joint.
 This paper draws attention to the impacts stemming from this incorporation of 
disaster into the global climate-change discourse, both with regard to how disas-
ters are comprehended as well as the politics and ethics of disaster-oriented practice 
informed by that understanding. Conceptually, it asserts that incorporating disaster 
into global climate change establishes a series of dichotomies through which such 
events are viewed: future versus past; global versus local; and natural versus social. 
The first term of each of these pairs is privileged when disaster is integrated into 
climate change, so that the climate-change disaster discourse places its emphasis on 
future disasters, on the global etiology of those disasters, and on their ontological 
footing within the realm of nature, even if that nature has been shaped by human 
activity. Heightened conflict, in this model, is among the future ramifications of 
climate disaster.
 This paper contends, however, that it is these dichotomies, and the overall climate-
change disaster discourse, that prevent understanding of how climate change and 
disaster are actually experienced in the very parts of the world declared as the most 
vulnerable. Instead, analysis needs to start with the experience of climate change 
and disaster in different locations and begin to reconstruct an understanding from 
those locations. This paper seeks to go beyond these dichotomies and to rethink the 
very concept of climate disaster by starting not from the hazard/vulnerability frame-
work common in disaster studies, but from the lived experiences and the histories 
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of climate change and disaster in specific parts of the world. Drawing on postcolonial 
environmental studies, it maintains that understanding climate change and disaster 
as they are faced in different locations requires that they be situated within multi-
scalar, plural histories of environmental violence, encompassing local, national, and 
regional dynamics along with the broadest set of global dynamics. War can be an 
integral part of these histories, and so one needs to incorporate conflict into under-
standing of climate change in new ways.
 To go beyond the limitations imposed by the dichotomies of future/past, global/
local, and natural/social on understanding of climate change and disaster, this study 
proposes the concept of devastation. Devastation can comprehend better the phenom-
ena that typically are seen as comprising climate change and climate disaster. The 
objective is to reframe climate disasters as comprised of specific aspects of longstand-
ing forms of violence that exist within a complex matrix spanning past and future, 
global and local, natural and social. A turn to devastation can open paths towards 
an understanding and practice that is epistemologically, politically, and ethically 
adequate with respect to divergent global experiences of phenomena associated with 
climate change and disaster. This concept of devastation is explored using the case 
study of drought in ‘post-conflict’ northern Uganda. The recent drought is situated 
in the context of broader processes of environmental devastation and violence, reveal-
ing how political violence is bound up with destructive environmental change in 
ways that demonstrate the limitations of the dichotomies of future/past, global/local, 
and natural/social.
Climate disaster between hazard and vulnerability
The incorporation of natural disaster into climate change can be widely found in 
current policy documents. Representative of these is Uganda’s National Climate 
Change Policy, adopted in 2015. ‘Most natural disasters that occur in Uganda are 
related to extreme weather events’ (GoU, 2015, p. 10), it explains, and so ‘Disaster 
Risk Management’ is ‘a frontline defence for adapting to the impacts of climate 
change’ (GoU, 2015, p. 27). The report speaks of climate change as ‘one of the great-
est challenges facing humanity in the century’, and declares that it ‘is likely to disrupt 
the Earth’s ecological systems and have serious negative consequences on agricul-
tural production and productivity, forests, water supply, health systems and overall 
human development’ (GoU, 2015, p. v). Indeed, Uganda is already seeing some of 
these effects, the document reports: ‘the average temperature in semi-arid areas in 
Uganda is rising’, as is ‘the frequency of hot days’, while rainfall is becoming less 
predictable and extreme weather events are intensifying (GoU, 2015, p. vi). As the 
policy attests, ‘Uganda has committed to the adoption and implementation of poli-
cies and measures designed to mitigate climate change and adapt to its impacts’, which 
requires ‘preparedness . . . in all sectors to ensure that the country is resilient to the 
adverse impact of climate change’ (GoU, 2015, p. v). 
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 Disaster preparation and risk reduction, in this framework, are thus about mitigat-
ing and minimising hazards while also addressing vulnerability. This reflects the 
dominant understanding of what constitutes a disaster: a natural hazard occurring 
in the context of economic, political, and social vulnerability (Wisner, Gaillard, and 
Kelman, 2011). Different approaches to disasters within the academic and policy 
literature may emphasise one or the other of these aspects (O’Brien and Eriksen, 
2007; Methmann and Oels, 2014): highly hazard-focused approaches may usually 
stress technical fixes such as improved seed varieties or securing critical infrastruc-
ture, while socially and politically informed treatments concentrate on ameliorating 
vulnerability (Blaikie et al., 1994). Indeed, vulnerability studies provide an impor-
tant corrective to purely hazard-centred approaches to disasters, pointing out how 
the spotlight on natural hazards can ignore the way in which vulnerability to cli-
mate disaster is produced ‘on the ground’, using Jesse Ribot’s (2010) phrase. That 
is, without a history of economic and political deprivation and marginalisation, the 
hazards caused by climate change would not present the dramatic risk that they do 
to certain communities. The implication is that policy interventions that concen-
trate on adapting to natural hazards risk leaving unaddressed the economic, political, 
and social conditions that make communities vulnerable in the first place (Ribot, 
2011). Hazards and vulnerability are found now in most treatments of climate disas-
ters, including in Uganda’s National Climate Change Policy (GoU, 2015).
 The distinction between natural hazard and social vulnerability becomes more 
polarised, however, as disasters become entwined with ideas of global climate change. 
With climate-change disasters, a focus on globally-produced climate hazards, and on 
global climate change as a kind of ultimate, universal natural hazard, endows the 
natural hazards side of the equation with new primacy (Ribot, 2014, p. 671). A clear 
line is drawn between the global and the local in the climate-change disaster dis-
course, with weight shifting to the global as the location from where inevitable, 
overwhelming hazards originate and disasters are driven. The global is constructed 
in opposition to the local, with the latter conceived as the site where particular, 
delimited forms of vulnerability are found. Accordingly, bringing disasters within 
a climate-change framework produces and relies upon a distinction between the 
global and the local, bound up with the distinction between the natural and the 
social: global climate change is seen to produce natural disruptions in climatic and 
meteorological patterns that, when extreme enough, intervene in contexts of local 
social vulnerability to create disasters. 
 This implies a globally differentiated epistemology following North–South lines. 
The global is the realm of objective universal truth, an object knowable through tech-
nical forms of natural scientific knowledge being produced in Northern laboratories 
mostly via computer models, in which the role of the rest of the world is to provide 
data (Edwards, 2010). The producers of this knowledge are also constructed as those 
who are themselves largely exempt from the consequences of climate-change dis-
aster, those whose resilience is high, who are above the rising water line. The local is 
the realm of social particularity, comprising those parts of the world that are said to 
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be at risk of suffering the most due to future climate disasters. These ‘local’ areas in 
the global South are deemed to be excluded from producing or accessing universal 
knowledge of global climate change and become locations defined by varying degrees 
of socially-produced vulnerability to these global forces. The local is constructed 
as divergent from the developed North through its vulnerability, defined by its lack 
of the North’s resilience. It is constructed as knowable through humanities and social 
sciences, but those methods are only useful to discern local specificity, only the par-
ticularity of local vulnerability; they have nothing to say about universal global cli-
mate change or about transformations in nature.
 The dichotomy between global, natural hazard and local, social vulnerability in 
the climate-change disaster discourse entails another dichotomy, that between future 
and past. A distinction is drawn between, on the one hand, disasters linked to increas-
ing global climate change, and, on the other, disasters and broader environmental 
crises that are not directly connected to global climate change. The focus on climate 
change thus infuses an ethos of urgency into those disasters seen to be caused by 
climate-change-related hazards, as they rise to primary importance in domestic and 
international policymaking. The consequence is that past or present crises within 
‘agricultural production and productivity, forests, water supply, health systems and 
overall human development’, as enumerated by the Ugandan strategy (GoU, 2015, 
p. v)—that is, instances of locally significant environmental destruction whatever 
their origin—are rendered invisible or less important by concentration on global 
warming and intensive preparation for global-warming-induced climate disasters. 
Non-climate-change-related environmental violence or disaster can be incorporated 
into the climate-change disaster framework only in a secondary role as contributors 
to vulnerability to climate-change-related disasters.
 In short, even as the vulnerability approach makes clear the need to take the past, 
the local, and the social into account, the climate-change disaster discourse inevi-
tably privileges the future, the global, and the natural. More fundamentally, however, 
it is the dichotomies themselves that may represent the greatest obstacle to under-
standing climate disaster today. Attention to the place of conflict—or, more broadly, 
violence—in the climate-change disaster discourse can illustrate the need to go beyond 
these dichotomies. With the incorporation of disaster into climate change, an urgency 
comes to characterise interventions and policies seeking to deal pre-emptively with 
the heightened conflict that is expected to arise from global climate change, from 
‘climate refugees’ to ‘resource wars’. This can be clearly seen in the Ugandan strat-
egy in the connection it draws between disaster and conflict. The report invokes 
looming conflict as a result of climate disaster: ‘Disaster risk management is also a 
key aspect of addressing socio-environmental conflicts and human security concerns, 
both locally and regionally, in respect to environmental refugees and management 
of transboundary resources’ (GoU, 2015, p. 27). Disaster preparation is about pre-
venting future conflict and insecurity caused by climate change. Despite important 
academic work questioning the linkage, the dominant understanding of the relation 
between climate change and conflict remains one of cause and effect: climate change 
From disaster to devastation: drought as war in northern Uganda S311
is proposed as the cause of conflict though various mechanisms (Busby et al., 2013),1 
most predominantly that climate change or heightened climatic variability increases 
resource pressures or introduces shocks to already vulnerable communities, members 
of which respond by turning to violence. The assumed existence of a stress–response 
model can reinforce the inability to ‘move beyond linear connections’ between con-
flict and disaster and to embrace a ‘multi-dimensional, context specific and histori-
cally relevant understanding of climatic disaster[s] and their impact on local politics’ 
(Siddiqi, 2014, p. 886). 
 The assumptions behind this model are familiar from much of the writing on 
violent conflict in Africa: rebels are supposed to be rational actors who turn to 
violence as a way of ensuring access to resources for survival or profit, while rural 
populations face resource scarcity and are ready to turn to ethnic violence when 
that scarcity becomes too great (Verhoeven, 2014). It follows that interventions to 
promote adaptation and resilience to climate change are assumed to be needed as a 
mechanism of conflict prevention. Uganda is thought to be at special risk as a highly 
vulnerable African country; within Uganda, the north is often presented as the 
area with the most significant chance of climate change leading to conflict (Oxfam, 
2008, p. 2; MER, 2015, p. 3). Past or ongoing conflict is included only insofar as it 
produces and exacerbates people’s vulnerability to looming climate hazards (Wisner, 
2011). A vicious circle is thus established: conflict  social vulnerability (+ natural 
climatic hazard)  conflict  . . . 
 What the paper seeks to show with the case of northern Uganda, however, is that 
political violence is not something that can be relegated to a future consequence of 
climate disaster or to a contributor to vulnerability. Instead, political violence is some-
thing that is already bound up with transformations in the climate, locally, nation-
ally, regionally, and globally. This paper argues that a consideration of drought in 
northern Uganda illuminates how it can be understood as embedded within the 
legacies of war, as a form of violence that has continued into the post-conflict period. 
Political violence has caused climate change and continues to cause climate change; 
or, perhaps more precisely, climate change is political violence, which becomes clear 
when one is able to get away from the dichotomies structuring the dominant under-
standing of climate disaster. Consequently, a focus on the relation between political 
violence and climate disaster can reveal the need to rethink the dichotomies and per-
haps to go beyond the very concept of disaster.
From disaster to devastation
The irony of the dichotomies embedded in the climate-change disaster framework 
is that now, in the age of the Anthropocene, global climate change itself is under-
stood to have rendered no longer viable the distinction between the natural and the 
social within climatic or environmental processes (Chakrabarty, 2009; Latour, 2014; 
Ghosh, 2016). The anthropogenic character of climatological transformations, as well 
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as of broader disruptions in the biosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere, and so on, means 
that a ‘natural’ hazard can no longer be taken to be natural in any essential way that 
fundamentally sets it off from the social processes that give rise to vulnerabilities. 
Various ways of comprehending the global co-constitution of the natural and the 
social have been developed, such as Jason Moore’s (2015) idea of a ‘web of life’, which 
entails broad histories of human–nature interaction (see also Parenti, 2011). That 
fundamental distinctions between the natural and the social need to be rethought 
is not a novel argument today, given the rapidly expanding literature sparked by 
the debates around the Anthropocene. Nevertheless, it may feel somewhat out of 
place in the more operationally-oriented disasters literature, in which meditations on 
the unstable ontology of earthquakes might appear an indulgence when faced with 
unstable buildings.
 Productive paths towards new understandings of climate change and disaster have 
been charted by those working in the ‘postcolonial environmental humanities’ and 
specifically within what Anthony Carrigan (2015) calls ‘postcolonial disaster studies’. 
For him, research and practice should ‘[t]reat postcolonial studies as a form of dis-
aster studies and vice versa’ (Carrigan, 2015, p. 117), for it is ‘impossible in many cases 
to disentangle catastrophic experiences from colonial and neocolonial power dynam-
ics’ (Carrigan, 2014, p. 4). Michael Niblett (2014, p. 109), drawing, like Carrigan, 
on the work of the Barbadian poet and literary scholar Kamau Brathwaite, explains 
that a tsunami, for instance, should not be understood as ‘an external force that 
impacts upon capitalist civilization, but as something constitutively implicated in its 
unfolding’. Both slavery and Hurricane Katrina, therefore, are ‘constitutive moments 
of a single unfolding spiral of catastrophe’, according to Niblett (2014, p. 109).
 For these critics, any particular disaster can be dissolved back into much longer 
histories and broader contexts of colonialism and capitalism, in which catastrophe is 
the dominant narrative. This postcolonial perspective reveals that large-scale envi-
ronmental disasters are not something that are yet to come from nature in a future of 
global climate change. Rather, for most of the world, disasters and dislocations are 
the reality of the present and have comprised centuries of the past. Hence, research 
needs to take account of ‘how environmental change is entwined with the narra-
tives, histories, and material practices of colonialism and globalization. Postcolonial 
approaches emphasise how experiences of environmental violence, rupture, and 
displacement are central ecological challenges across the global south’ (DeLoughrey 
et al., 2015, p. 2).
 I agree that the processes that tend to be distinguished as climate disasters can be 
productively reframed within these longer histories of environmental violence, rup-
ture, and displacement. However, I would look less to (global) colonialism and capi-
talism as constituting a single dominant narrative of catastrophe, within which specific 
events or processes need to be framed. Instead, I would maintain that understand-
ing the environmental violence confronted in different locations around the globe 
requires that violence be situated within histories stretching across many registers, 
that confound the dichotomy between global and local by encompassing local, national, 
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and regional processes along with sets of global dynamics (Peluso and Watts, 2001; 
Peet, Robbins, and Watts, 2011). 
 In this way, the insights of Anthropocene thinking and postcolonial eco-criticism 
can allow a move away from the dichotomies of natural–social as well as of global–
local and future–past that are being entrenched within the predominant climate-
change disaster approach, and in particular away from the privileged value placed 
on the first term in each pair. Instead, one can start, as eco-criticism suggests, from 
the experience of climate disaster where and as it occurs, using that as a window on 
to the dense local, national, regional, and global forces, both natural and social, that 
congeal at particular points to cause widespread destruction or suffering through 
the environment. For a subsistence farmer whose crops are not growing, who faces a 
drought or a flood, it would not seem to matter much whether or not scientists can 
attribute that particular hazard to global climate change. By taking the farmer’s 
experience and understanding of the environment as the starting point, instead of 
rising global greenhouse gas levels or deviations from scientifically-determined clima-
tological norms, one is prompted to reconceive climate change and climate disaster. 
Droughts and floods, whatever their origin, as well as the disasters they give rise to, 
are climate change in the sense that they represent the most important alterations 
to people’s lived environments that affect their opportunity to survive and flourish. 
Furthermore, the environmental devastation that proceeds from deforestation, dis-
placement owing to infrastructure development, oil extraction, rapid urbanisation, 
rural proletarianisation, or war are all wrenching, immediate, devastating forms of 
climate change for those who experience them, however attenuated their relation-
ship may be to global warming. The present and the past are thus not ignored in 
favour of the future; the local is given equal standing with the global; and the social 
is seen as co-constituted with the natural all the way down. Starting with these nar-
ratives is fundamental because what the environment is and how people relate to the 
non-human world will be subject to many different visions, so determining what 
exactly the ‘climate’ is that is changing is crucial (Taylor, 2015). This signals the need 
to dissolve yet another dichotomy, that between climate change and disaster itself.
 In short, climate disaster can be seen not necessarily as a result of global warming 
caused by rising greenhouse gas emissions, as global and future-oriented. Rather, 
climate disaster is represented by local, concrete, and present forms of devastation, 
interlaced with national, regional, and global processes, which matter to people, and 
which are transforming their environments and climates today. These forms of 
devastation can render environments uninhabitable in ways that are imagined only 
by the most dramatic of future-oriented global climate-change scenarios. The worst 
projected disasters of the future are already present for many of the world’s poor, and 
have been so for decades or even centuries (Davis, 2002). Clearly, global warming 
will play a part in these forms of climate change and climate disaster, but this role can 
be understood only once a different orientation for the etiology of climate disaster is 
employed—one that does not look to rising global greenhouse gas levels and their 
future impacts, but rather looks to the past, to specific histories of environmental and 
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social devastation that produce droughts or floods now. An attention to how natural 
and social processes are co-constituting becomes increasingly important (Ingold, 
2011; Taylor, 2015), and disaster can be de-exceptionalised (Hilhorst, 2013).
 In place of the concept of disaster, Carrigan (2015) and Niblett (2014) seem to sug-
gest catastrophe to capture this long-term process of the natural and social onslaught 
of capitalism and colonialism. Catastrophe, however, may entail too much of a sudden, 
exceptional character; I would propose instead the concept of devastation, which places 
the emphasis on long-ranging and lasting ramifications and can bring together a wide 
set of forms of violence within it. With a temporal dimension more akin to Rob 
Nixon’s (2011) idea of ‘slow violence’, but able to include periods of overwhelming, 
direct, atrocious violence as well, devastation entails both violence against people 
and against the land, plants, and air; it is the outcome of broad violence against ecolo-
gies in which human and non-human are entwined.
 By beginning from the ways in which climatological disruptions are experienced 
and understood within environmental, political, and social histories, the category 
of devastation can avoid becoming simply an undifferentiated sweep of violence. 
Analytically, narratives of climate change and disaster among those experiencing 
them can reveal the economic, political, and social processes that produce devastation 
(Quarantelli, 1998; Oliver-Smith and Hoffman, 2002, p. 18). The researcher can 
work to integrate those narratives into other narratives of climate disaster, which 
would include regional or global meteorological transformations and regional or 
global histories of capitalism, colonialism, and racism (Hage, 2017). The narratives 
created by researchers can be of use both to those immediately affected by a disaster 
as well as those working in the disaster prevention and response industry and the 
professional scientific community. 
Drought as war
The East African drought, therefore, is not best understood as a globally-induced 
natural hazard affecting local vulnerability. Instead, it should be seen as embedded 
within ongoing, longstanding, multiscalar processes of environmental devastation 
and generated by equally multiscalar histories of human engagement with the mate-
rial processes of the planet, which can be framed within numerous, but often over-
lapping, narratives of devastation. In northern Uganda, war provides the dominant 
narrative of devastation within which climate disaster and drought can be compre-
hended. Civil war raged in the region from 1986–2006, pitting the rebel Lord’s 
Resistance Army against the Government of Uganda (Branch, 2011). The insurgency 
was infamous for its atrocities against civilians, but the government’s counterinsur-
gency also was devastating. From 1996 in some locations, and from the early 2000s in 
others, the Government of Uganda forcibly displaced and interned the entire rural 
population of the Acholi sub-region, comprising more than one million people, 
in wretched camps (Dolan, 2009; Branch, 2011). The forced internment created a 
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humanitarian disaster, and led to widespread cultural, economic, and social destruc-
tion. Movement out of the camps and back to rural villages and homesteads began 
haltingly in 2007, following the conclusion of the war; in some places, it is still an 
ongoing process.
 War is thus part of the past, but its legacies shape the present and certain forms 
of war-time violence continue into the present. Hence, the violence of the war, 
past and present, constitutes the dominant narrative for understanding the devasta-
tion that people face today, including in relation to the environment. As argued 
below, even drought, which the climate-change disaster framework would associate 
with the natural and global, with its relevance for conflict residing in the future, can 
be seen as part of this history of war as devastation. Indeed, drought is commonly 
viewed as tied up with the violence of the war. As explained below, the state and 
the structures of violence that it supports, in the context of the devastation wreaked 
by the counterinsurgency policy of long-term mass forced internment, are seen as 
responsible for the drought through one key route: the mass extraction of trees. 
Climate change can be understood as the set of wrenching transformations that 
have resulted from the broad legacies of the war as well as the continued forms of 
environmental violence confronted by the community at present.
 Instead of the vicious circle of conflict  social vulnerability + natural hazard 
 conflict  . . . , a different relation between disaster and conflict can be posed. 
War is the primary framework for comprehending a devastation that incorporates 
what is understood by the climate-change disaster discourse as social vulnerability 
plus natural hazard. This opens the way for a more complex appreciation of the rela-
tion between conflict and disaster, in which they are intertwined within multiscalar 
ecological, economic, and political processes.
 Again, in Uganda, this war is not the only history, and not the only narrative that 
matters. Indeed, global meteorological processes, themselves socially embedded, are 
part of the devastation. However, this narrative of war should assume primary posi-
tion in understanding drought and framing responses to it instead of abstracting 
certain elements from that history needed to comprise the categories of ‘natural 
hazard’ and ‘social vulnerability’. With this revised interpretation of climate disaster, 
no longer are climate shocks seen as producing resource scarcity and consequently 
leading to conflict and insecurity. Instead of climate disaster causing local conflict 
within a global climate change framework, conflict might be viewed as causing 
climate change, or perhaps both the violence of disaster and the violence of conflict 
are elements of broader, longer-term histories of violence. This also helps to qualify 
some of the more nuanced, empirically-grounded studies of conflict and disaster: 
Siddiqi (2014, pp. 888–889) shows that these studies frequently present a natural 
disaster as opening up a political space into which either the state can reassert itself 
through aid provision and reconstruction assistance, or else the political opposition 
can establish its legitimacy by filling that gap. Climate disaster, in this sense, can 
spawn a change, therefore, from the legitimacy of one political regime to another 
(Pelling and Dill, 2010). In northern Uganda, however, the dynamic is different: it 
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is not the state’s response, or lack thereof, to climate disaster that has political mean-
ing; rather, the drought itself is seen as political, as a continuation of state violence. 
By being part of longer processes of social–natural devastation, climate disaster may 
not comprise a disruption, but rather an intensification of, and continuity with, these 
existing political arrangements and structures.
 Northern Uganda demonstrates that the effect of disaster is not necessarily to 
reorient people politically, but to confirm their political subjugation by an essentially 
predatory and antagonistic state and its agents, a subjugation that increasingly threat-
ens the very basis of their livelihoods. People’s desperation and insecurity in the 
face of state-violence-driven climate disaster thus does not lead to conflicts among 
rural people, but to a confirmation of their oppression by the state. One should not 
view potential future violence as resource conflict in response to climate disaster; 
instead, it should be seen as a continuation of the violence of the war, perhaps even 
involving new armed opposition to the state.
 Coming to terms with the shortcomings of the dominant climate disaster/conflict 
paradigm is important not only as a conceptual exercise. As climate change is increas-
ingly perceived as the primary threat to development and security in Africa, climate 
change adaptation and resilience are coming to dominate the international govern-
ance regime (USAID, 2013). In Uganda, as in many other African countries, this 
policy shift towards climate-change adaptation and resilience is still in its initial 
stages. Nevertheless, the dominant climate-change-centred understanding of disas-
ter and conflict looks likely to have an increasing impact on the economy, political 
structures, politics, and people’s lives.
 ‘Climate change’ in Acholi
Disruptions to and changes in the environment were the major subjects of interviews 
and discussions conducted among rural communities in northern Uganda’s Acholi 
sub-region in 2017.2 Ongoing drought and broader problems with rain were raised 
consistently: less rain, especially during the planting seasons, was noted, but so too 
was the fact that when rain did come, frequently it was very powerful. Along with 
reduced rainfall there were periods of brighter sun that ruined crops. In addition, 
increased winds destroyed crops or homesteads, as did unusual weather events such 
as hailstorms. As an older woman explained in a focus group discussion: ‘In the past, 
rain would always come gently and smooth and the food would grow well; but 
now, you hear it has rained but the rain has destroyed gardens, and when the wind 
comes it is very strong and ends up blowing and destroying everything. Now the 
ground is just drying up. For me, those are the changes I see, and indeed there are 
many changes’.
 These changes to the weather, though, are not seen as isolated developments or as 
fundamentally different from other environmental changes that may not be related 
to global climate change. Indeed, the environmental transformations that people 
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often explained as being the most important—what ‘climate change’ means in the 
context—seem to have begun as people returned home from government-run intern-
ment camps. In most discussions, the division marking the beginning of the difficult 
present time is the departure from the camps and people’s embarkation on an effort 
to re-establish lives and livelihoods in an ecological, political, and social environment 
that had been torn asunder by two decades of brutal civil war and up to a decade 
of forced confinement. Contemporary conditions were almost always contrasted to 
the time before the phase spent in the camps, with the latter blamed for many cur-
rent problems.
 As people returned from the camps in the late 2000s and early 2010s and sought 
to establish livelihoods in a radically changed setting, the challenges they faced in 
doing so became clear. First, the landscape itself was unfamiliar to the returnees after 
years away. Fields were overgrown, homesteads ruined, water sources destroyed, 
and many large trees, essential for boundary demarcation or orientation, as well as 
having cultural and spiritual importance, had been felled. New ‘security roads’ had 
been opened up by the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF), while old footpaths 
had been swallowed by the undergrowth (HURIFO, 2007). Landmines and unex-
ploded ordinance were scattered, posing dangers to those clearing their fields or to 
children playing in the bush; the many people killed during the war had left cer-
tain areas considered dangerous and possibly haunted by spirits. Perhaps most dif-
ficult of all, people were returning to their land without cattle, which had been the 
primary form of wealth but had been looted during the early years of the war by 
cattle rustlers and the Ugandan military.
 In this hostile environment, people often described their surroundings, includ-
ing the weather, as a force in opposition to them. The word that is typically used in 
the Acholi language to denote weather conditions is piny, as in piny lyet—it is hot—
or piny ngic—it is cold. Piny can also refer to conditions of darkness or daylight or to 
one’s surroundings more broadly, touching on its environmental, social, and even 
spiritual dimensions, given the deep meanings with which the landscape is invested 
(Finnström, 2008). A consequence of the war was that, as one person put it, ‘now 
the environment has become unfriendly’. Another expanded on these interlinked 
factors: ‘In the past when trees were not cut down, we used to carry out farming 
peacefully because our crops would grow well and there was no army. But now we 
came back from the camps, we lack water, our crops don’t grow well, and we don’t 
have money to pay fees for our children’. The aspect of this bad environment of 
most concern was the perceived falling productivity of land and the inability to 
survive from farming alone. As one person noted: ‘during that time before we ran 
off to camp, everything was okay, you would dig and your food would grow nicely. 
You would dig one acre [and] you would even get four bags, but now . . . even 
though you dig, there is no food that comes out’. Very concrete legacies of the war 
were identified as causing the fall in productivity. During the conflict, granaries 
had been destroyed and seed stocks lost, as had farming implements and household 
supplies. Many young people, having grown up in the camps, lacked basic knowledge 
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of building homesteads or planting crops. Others identified toxic legacies of the war: 
‘In our area here, there were very many bombs, so the chemicals from the bombs, 
sometimes we think, is what has brought trouble in this place’. People also blamed 
the chemicals reportedly being used by the expanding agricultural plantations, as 
well as the dust created by new quarrying works. The cause most commonly cited for 
declining productivity, however, was the destructive changes in weather patterns 
attributed to the massive loss of trees.
 There was some debate over the exact way in which cutting trees was leading to 
decreased rainfall and to drought. Some claimed the chainsaws were keeping the 
rain away; others pointed to the inability to perform the rituals that had brought 
rain now that the trees, the site of these practices, were gone. Yet others blamed the 
foreigners doing the cutting, contending that they were performing their own rituals 
to keep the rain away. Almost everyone to whom the research team spoke, though, 
agreed that the most important factor was the forests’ role in attracting rain and 
retaining water. Without forests, rain will not come, and, when it does fall, it will 
fail to soak into the soil and will drain away. As one woman put it: ‘The way I see 
it, piny is not as it used to be in the past. Back then, if the rain decides to fall, it 
shows that real rainfall is coming, even the air changes. The wind moves like this 
and then the trees could shield excess wind. But these days, they have cut the trees, 
the wind moves anyhow and now even the rain periods come and pass without any-
thing happening. From January all the way to March, then it would start raining 
and go all the way like to June. Then two months after that, people start planting 
food in their gardens again. But now, you can go up to August like bang! . . . The 
sun is shining so bright and hot and there is no rain’. A group of women in a village 
in Amuru District added: ‘Yes, [tree cutting] is there. They cut almost everything, 
they started way from up there to all the way down. Now there’s nothing; the rain 
has also gone silent and now, for us, we are dying of hunger because the ground has 
dried up. We are going to die of hunger, there is nothing to eat—you see this, they 
come and cut everything’. In a nearby parish, a similar account was provided: tree-
cutting ‘is ruining the forest. There isn’t any forest anymore. You know that the 
forest also brings rain and prevents the wind. Now the forest isn’t here to stop the 
wind and bring the rain’. One interviewee drew attention to differences with the 
past: ‘People dig by themselves for two to three years with nothing to gain from it. 
It is not that we don’t dig, we do, but then it is the little rainfall we receive that is a 
problem and that is because of the trees’.
 This fall in productivity and decrease in rain has dangerous implications for the 
future. One person underscored that it is the ‘children who will suffer’: ‘They will 
not have any trees left. It is the war that caused all these problems—in the past, 
people respected each other but now people do not do that anymore because people 
just cut down any tree on any hill they come across’. 
 These negative consequences were not limited to declining agricultural produc-
tivity. Deforestation has harmed people’s broader livelihoods, as the commons that 
all depended on for building materials, firewood, grazing land, and medicinal plants 
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were destroyed. A group of young people in a nearby sub-county stated that the loss 
of trees was also destroying the foundation of communal solidarity by erasing the 
physical reference points for traditional authority within the community. A spiritual 
devastation followed, as the homes of spirits and trees with significant historical reso-
nance were cut and shipped off. One person predicted that, in five years, ‘this place 
will turn into desert’.
 These narratives of tree cutting are not to be understood as a ‘cultural’ interpreta-
tion of an ‘objective’ phenomenon, a ‘local narrative’ of a ‘global’ process of climate 
change (Daniels and Endfield, 2009; Taylor, 2015). Rather, the tree cutting itself, 
together with the destructive ecological, social, and spiritual changes caused by it, 
including drought, are the disaster; they are climate change. Yet, these destructive 
transformations in people’s surroundings were themselves not isolated; they were 
connected to longer histories of political violence. Together, they form parts of a 
narrative of devastation focused on the violence of the war, past and present. And 
so, to understand the drought and its consequences, as well as climate change, one 
needs to explore the history of these cultural, ecological, political, and social devel-
opments to grasp how drought is constituted as a social–natural phenomenon, part of 
a history of devastation. Central to comprehending these histories today is charcoal.3
The war against trees
While hardwood timber extraction, the spread of commercial farming, and the 
expansion of grazing lands were all cited as factors causing the loss of forests, one 
culprit was dominant: large-scale charcoal production. The recent and still expand-
ing industrial production of charcoal was widely blamed for the mass extraction of 
trees and the clear-cutting of forested land. As one woman explained: ‘For me, I see 
that the time that charcoal burning was so much was in the year that just ended. 
There was a lot of charcoal burning, it was really too much; it was almost taking 
place every day’. Another emphasised that ‘because of charcoal burning, hunger has 
come in. Charcoal has thrown hunger our way’. These sentiments were repeated in 
discussions across the region.
 Grasping the origins of charcoal production requires exploring the demand for 
charcoal, the modes through which rural communities have been incorporated into 
it, and the larger trade networks that enable its generation and marketing. Charcoal 
production and trade are immediately related to the war and its legacies, whereas 
the demand for charcoal is determined largely by national and international political 
economies. The drought is, in this sense, spawned by forms of violence that emerged 
and were consolidated during the war and that are part of a longer history of devas-
tation, while also being integrated into global political economies of energy.
 Increasing demand for charcoal is a product of Uganda’s rapid urbanisation (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2013); more than 80 per cent of the population 
of Kampala, the capital, and other urban centres is reliant on charcoal for meeting 
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energy needs (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, 2016; Mukwaya, 2016). 
For years, most charcoal came from the central region, but with the end of open 
fighting in the north in 2006–07, a vast new reserve of trees for charcoal production 
was made available (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development 2016; Miteva et 
al., 2017). As people moved back home after the war, having lost their cattle and 
savings, they were in need of cash to rebuild their lives and to pay school fees and 
for other essential services. Hence, people turned to charcoal production. At first it 
was largely small-scale and based on household labour. However, an industrialised 
mode of production began to take over within a few years. Charcoal dealers started 
to bring in their own work teams, which they place in camps to clear-cut large swathes 
of forest using chainsaws. Large trucks ply the remote dirt roads and tracks, ferrying 
workers and supplies in and innumerable sacks of charcoal out. Hundreds of migrant 
workers can clear many kilometres of land, extracting even the roots of trees, and 
leaving behind cratered landscapes of burning pits and the few scrub trees and bushes 
too small to burn. One parish chief claimed that the damage caused by commercial 
charcoal producers was so great that when land had been cleared of trees and used 
as a burning site, planting could not occur again for 10 years. Now, almost 40 per cent 
of Uganda’s supply of charcoal to urban areas is reported to come from the north, 
whereas a decade ago it was negligible (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, 
2016, p. 57). Available statistics on the scale of production are dramatic: in 2014, it 
was reported that Amuru and Gulu Districts’ forest cover had been almost halved 
since 1990, and 4,000–5,000 bags of charcoal are estimated to be removed from just 
one district every week (Acholi Times, 2016a). Charcoal has come to comprise a ‘vio-
lent environment’ (Peluso and Watts, 2001), centred on a specific ‘resource complex’ 
(Watts and Peluso, 2014).
 The dominant picture of the charcoal trade painted in the literature tends to 
posit a highly decentralised, fragmented sector with little vertical integration (Zulu 
and Richardson, 2013). In northern Uganda, though, the production of and trade 
in charcoal appears to be directed from the top, driven and made possible by the 
involvement, sometimes direct, of the state and the UPDF. As one informant under-
lined: ‘The people who bring their workers . . . to produce charcoal here are military 
commanders’. People often cited the presence of armed men among the burning 
teams and transporters, as well as the involvement of military personnel without 
uniforms. Another person commented: ‘The government workers give the rich 
people permission to cut the trees so that even if you complain, nothing will be 
done for you. . . . Those people have security that we can’t stop’. Local government 
officials spoke about arresting illegal charcoal dealers and impounding their charcoal, 
only to get a call from military headquarters demanding that the person be released. 
Human rights activists reported receiving threatening telephone calls when they 
were seen as interfering with charcoal dealers or traders. Similarly, after the Local 
Council 5 Chairman of Amuru District, Michael Lakony, imposed a total ban on 
production, he announced that he had been threatened. He warned that: ‘I have 
names and recorded voices of the big persons in government and the army which I 
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will expose if they continue’ (Acholi Times, 2016b). In sum, there is a widespread per-
ception that those with power can grab land or extract trees for charcoal with impunity.
 The involvement of the state and the UPDF means that the devastation caused 
by tree cutting, and the drought to which it is seen as leading, is widely understood 
as a continuation of the violence of the war and encampment. As one informant 
pointed out, the community was now experiencing the ‘war that has been waged 
against trees’. The end of the conflict did not mean the end of state violence in the 
north; instead, it simply took on different forms. Those controlling tree cutting 
frequently are identified as the very people who were at the forefront of the state’s 
counterinsurgency in Acholiland. Uganda’s military has long been accused of loot-
ing natural resources, especially in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and southern Sudan, contributing significantly to the consolidation of Uganda’s 
business/political/military elite (Sjögren, 2013). The military seems to have brought 
these practices back to northern Uganda. The officers who were operating in 
Acholiland returned with peace to start exploiting its natural resources. There had 
been a small amount of logging of hardwoods during the war, but this looting esca-
lated dramatically in the post-war period. In some cases, the post-war extraction of 
trees for charcoal and timber followed exactly the same routes as had the counter-
insurgency: many of the security roads that were cut by the UPDF during the war 
to allow its military vehicles to reach remote locales are now the very roads that are 
being used to extract charcoal and timber. The militarisation of the north has con-
tinued, therefore, into the post-war period, as the same forces that had been involved 
in the devastation of the war—the government, the outsiders who were its agents, 
and collaborators within northern society—are now blamed for the deforestation 
that has produced drought.
 Moreover, tree cutting has brought with it other forms of state-driven environ-
mental violence, other forms of climate change as war. Most notably, land grabs for 
commercial farming are widely reported. Sugar cane plantations have attracted the 
most notoriety: one case has seen years of struggle between the community and the 
Madhvani Group, backed up by state security (Martiniello, 2015). But it is not just 
extreme cases where state violence is involved; as one person noted: ‘the local people 
just wake up and find investors here, ploughing land without even knowing where 
they came from and for how long they would be staying here because of the connec-
tions the landowners have’. 
 Military force is apparently used to guard some commercial farms belonging to 
elites, and people assert that some who had opposed giving land to plantations had 
been threatened or arrested. Land that was formerly part of the commons has been 
enclosed, and environmental pollution is reported near plantations, including damage 
to water supplies, thought to be a result of the use of chemical fertilisers, herbicides, 
and pesticides. Another source of widespread environmental concern in the commu-
nity is the arrival of large herds of cattle, brought by truck from the south and left to 
graze on land either leased or otherwise accessed by the cattle owners. These herds 
are blamed for intensive degradation of the land and for destroying crops and fragile 
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communal areas. Like the charcoal dealers, the cattle keepers are largely considered 
to be untouchable because they are armed and because of their reported military and 
government connections. Even relations with wildlife have been incorporated into 
the matrix of political violence. Elephants have been leaving Murchison Falls National 
Park and destroying crops and threatening human life. People widely believe that the 
recent rise in oil exploration and traffic through the park is to blame for the frequent 
elephant incursions. Some who fight back against the elephants have recounted vio-
lent reprisals by park rangers for any suspected harm done to animals. Many com-
munities said that they felt that their livelihoods and lives were being sacrificed by 
the government for the interests of the oil companies. Game parks, in particular 
Murchison Falls, are becoming increasingly militarised, and game wardens are seen 
as the agents of dispossession and state violence (Carmody and Taylor, 2016).
Vulnerability and adaptation to devastation 
Drought in northern Uganda cannot be viewed as an isolated phenomenon, as a 
climate disaster caused by global climate change producing natural hazards that 
intervene in contexts of local vulnerability. Instead, it has to be seen as part of much 
broader regimes of devastation in which the dominant history is one of war, regimes 
that span the social and the natural, the global and the local, and the past and the 
future. Rather than treating conflict as something that either results from a future 
of global climate change or that contributes to local vulnerability, it should be seen 
as spanning both, dissolving the line between global natural hazard and local social 
vulnerability. The particular hazard at work in this case—drought and changing 
rainfall patterns—was produced locally by social forces as much as it was produced 
globally by natural forces (which, in the Anthropocene, were themselves also shaped 
by social forces). Vulnerability cannot be thought of as something purely local, as 
there was nothing purely local about the war in Uganda nor about the significant 
support that the Ugandan government has received from international donors over 
the past two decades, making possible the conflict and contemporary militarisation. 
Also stretching far beyond the local are the economic and political interests advanc-
ing the extraction of trees. A case in point is the international political economy in 
which East Africa’s urbanisation is being pushed forward relentlessly, but energy for 
it must come from the massive, destructive dispossession of forests, requiring state 
violence to be effected. Even global warming can be conceived of as a form of vio-
lence, whether the violence of decades of extractive, unequal capitalist development, 
or, even more directly, the emissions generated directly by the military–industrial 
complex (Fressoz and Bonneuil, 2016).
 Climate change itself does not exist purely in the global sphere, but rather, it is 
occurring through myriad forces that must be defined, starting from the experience of 
those living amidst it. And so global climate change also must be reconceived—there 
are certainly transformations happening to planetary systems that can be discerned 
using scientific methods, but global climate change is also the aggregate of many 
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forms of climate change taking place in locations across the globe. This means that 
the firm distinction between future environmental disaster and past vulnerability 
needs to be dissolved, too. Today’s drought, once placed in its ecological, historical, 
and social context is embedded in the ongoing legacies of the war, but it is also one 
aspect of a much longer history of devastation, stretching from violence between 
slave traders and different armed clan groups, to the so-called pacification effort of 
the British and its forced population displacement, to the violence of the Idi Amin 
era, neoliberal structural adjustment, and extractivist ‘development’ now.
 Drought, and the broader devastation faced by communities after the war, thus 
crosses the divides between natural and social, global and local, future and past, but 
not just along the lines of hazard and vulnerability. Both armed conflict and drought 
can be seen as parts of a long history of devastation that is punctuated by periods of 
armed violence and atrocity. To focus attention primarily on future disasters stem-
ming from the natural hazards resulting from global climate change, and on the 
conflicts to which they might give rise, is to ignore, and do injustice, to this long 
legacy of violence and war. It is also to disregard the narratives of climate change, 
drought, and devastation among those who are affected by these disasters, and to pay 
no heed to what they present as needing to be solved to ensure that there is a future.
 Adaptation, resilience, and preparedness as part of the climate-change disaster model 
thus have the potential to lock in precisely this reality of devastation. Interventions 
can place existing economic, political, and social conditions beyond question, outside 
of the realm of what can be addressed by climate-change-focused policies. In fact, 
these interventions can even entrench the existing economic, political, and social 
order by endeavouring to increase its resilience and to help it adapt (Barnett and 
O’Neill, 2010; Brown, 2011; Ribot, 2014). Violence is placed beyond question and 
prevented from being addressed justly; adaptation and resilience threaten to preserve 
the unjust order created and enforced through violence. To understand the relation 
between climate change and conflict as cause and effect may itself reproduce devas-
tation as it informs policy interventions. The challenge is to ensure that the response 
to climate disasters prepares for the future by building on just engagement with the 
violence of the past and the present.
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Endnotes
1 For critical work, see the special issues of Political Geography (2007; 26(6)), Journal of Peace Research 
(2012; 49(1)), Climatic Change (2013; 123(1)), International Journal of Human Rights (2014; 18(3)), and 
Geopolitics (2014; 19(4)). See also Bettini (2013), Hsiang and Burke (2013), Theisen, Gleditsch, and 
Buhaug (2013), and Devlin and Hendrix (2014).
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2 These sections draw on research conducted by a team comprising not only the author, but also 
Paska Aber, Phionah Alanyo, Miriam Auma, Anneeth Hundle, Giuliano Martiniello, Laury Ocen, 
Eric Awich Ochen, Paul Omach, Arthur Owor, as well as Human Rights Focus–Gulu, from July–
October 2017. This is one of a series of papers written or co-written by members of the research 
team. In total, 22 discussions were held in five districts of the Acholi sub-region. They took place 
in the Acholi language and were then transcribed and translated into English. A dozen individual 
interviews were held, all in English. The paper also draws on the author’s longer-term research and 
work in the region for the past 15 years. Research ethics clearance was approved by the Research 
Ethics Committee of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Makerere University, and 
permission was granted by the Uganda National Council of Science and Technology and the 
Office of the President. Funding was provided through an Interdisciplinary Innovation Award (grant 
number AH/P008232/1) funded from allocations to the Arts and Humanities Research Council 
and the Economic and Social Research Council under the Global Challenges Research Fund. 
3 For a more expansive discussion of the politics of charcoal in contemporary Uganda, upon which 
this paper draws, see Branch and Martiniello (forthcoming).
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